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I. Executive Summary
The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) poses the gravest threat to regional security
in the Middle East and threatens attacks against Western targets. Its rise from its preceding
group, Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), coincides with a hallmark of brutality and disregard for human
life and rights. Rape, enslavement, genocide, murder, torture and violence against children and
women are daily occurrences within the territories that ISIL controls (Amos 2014, 2). It operates
within the specter of the Syrian civil war – which has resulted in the largest number of displaced
persons in any current conflict, with 7.2 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) and 3.2
million refugees (Amos 2014, 2) – and the sectarian divisions rife throughout Iraq. Thus, the
most violent terrorist group to date is operating within a realm beset by humanitarian
deprivation, state instability and increasingly fanatical sectarian warfare. Its vision of a Caliphate
ruling through an extreme interpretation of Sharia threatens the livelihood of millions of human
beings and breeds irrational, fundamentalist Islamists who cannot be reasoned with or pacified.
Accordingly, I address four major points in this paper to resolve the crises imposed by ISIL in
Iraq and Syria.
First, I provide a history of the circumstances that caused ISIL’s creation and made its
strength possible. The history of AQI, the sectarian divisions within Iraq both before and after
the 2003 U.S. invasion, and the present difficulties found within Iraq illustrate how AQI found
support among Sunni tribes and scored several stunning military victories against the Iraqi army
in 2014. I examine the Syrian civil war’s causes and present conditions, as well as how that
conflict’s fanatical nature has fostered an environment friendly to ISIL and allowed its ascension
as the most powerful armed group fighting in the region. Understanding these circumstances is
vital to defeating ISIL and preventing its resurgence.
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Second, I examine three major instances in history where terrorism was combatted and
different strategies were implemented to counter or eliminate the groups involved and the
subsequent outcomes – the Irish Republican Army, The Tamil Tigers, and Hamas. I give brief
histories of the conflicts, draw conclusions from each situation and offer insights on what
strategies were effective and potentially useful against ISIL. Third, I offer three policy options
for destroying ISIL. “Option 1” recommends minimizing our involvement to reduce civilian
casualties, avoid risk to Coalition forces and focus solely on eliminating ISIL’s leadership.
“Option 2” involves Coalition airstrikes against all ISIL targets, logistical support for the Iraqi
armed forces, the Free Syrian Army and the Kurdish Peshmerga, as well as dissemination of
battlefield intelligence to these groups. “Option 3” entails a large Coalition action that would
create United Nations Safe Zones in Kurdish-controlled areas of Iraq and Syria to protect
refugees and IDPs, undertake airstrikes against ISIL and provide logistical and ground support
for the Peshmerga and Iraqi ground troops. It also calls for the declaration of a no-fly zone over
Syria, possible strikes against Al-Assad regime targets, increased logistical and political support
for Sunni Opposition troops, and forcing a political resolution to end the Syrian civil war.
Lastly, I recommend undertaking a policy that attacks the underlying issues allowing
ISIL’s existence, prevents future humanitarian catastrophes in Iraq and Syria, and directly
combats the group in both states. “Option 3” offers a strategy to eradicate both ISIL and the
forces that make its existence possible: neighboring failed states and the schism between Sunni
and Shia in Iraq. While it is the most ambitious strategy, “Option 3” stands the best chance of
resolving the Syrian War, forging a federation of states in Iraq, and destroying ISIL through
direct action and undermining its bases of support. ISIL and the circumstances that led to its
successes occurred over a long time period; thus the remedies for destroying it and rectifying
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these circumstances will also require long-term involvement and commitment if any serious
effort is to be successfully made. “Option 3” is difficult and is the riskiest approach because it is
the only plan that addresses the regional power balance, governmental upheaval in Iraq, and
undertakes the responsibility of bringing an end to the Syrian civil war. Also, eliminating the
impetus to terrorism is as crucial as dismantling and destroying ISIL. Therefore, I recommend a
broad and extensive engagement in the region that ends the Syrian civil war, reconstitutes Iraq as
a federation or provides clear governance and political reconciliation, humanitarian intervention,
and armed action to destroy ISIL and liberate the territories that it occupies.
II. Introduction
ISIL’s egregious human rights abuses, atrocities against minorities, execution of
prisoners and seizure of vast territories distinguish it from previous terrorist groups, which in the
past have used violence as a means of political change and not territorial gain. In contrast, ISIL
has seized territory to create a Caliphate, enacting its own version of Sharia and political Islam.
Forged out of the cauldron of the Syrian civil war and the disillusionment of Sunni tribes in the
northwest of Iraq, ISIL advances have caused hundreds of thousands of people to flee and
subjected millions of people to its rule. Over 130,000 Syrian Kurds fled into Turkey in a scant
three days due to ISIL’s activities near the Syrian city of Kobane (British Broadcasting
Corporation, 2014, “Thousands of Syrian Refugees Flee” 1). Thus, ISIL and its numerous
atrocities have dramatically exacerbated the refugee crisis hemorrhaging from the Syrian
conflict. Further, it has dramatically affected the ever-fluid balance in the Syrian civil war by
attacking both Syrian government forces and other armed groups fighting the Assad regime. ISIL
has emerged as the most powerful armed group fighting in Syria. It poses a serious existential
threat to the Iraqi government and the government of Iraqi Kurdistan.
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ISIL emerged from the disarray of post-2003 Iraq as the remnants of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, a
group founded and led by Jordanian national Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi. The group was notorious
for its indiscriminate suicide bombings, beheadings of prisoners and attacks against targets of
sectarian significance (Hughes 2010, 168). Al-Zarqawi was killed in a U.S. airstrike in 2006, and
eventually Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi assumed leadership of the group (Shadid 2010). ISIL’s entry
into the Syrian civil war and seizure of territory has significantly strengthened it, along with an
influx of experienced foreign fighters. Amid the chaos of the Syrian conflict and the sectarian
divisions of Iraqi society, the group found itself able to seize territory spanning the two states’
borders and expanded its advance into Iraq. It defeated or caused the withdrawal of Iraqi army
units defending Mosul - a city of 1.8 million people - and captured it in June 2014. ISIL also
captured the 310,000 barrel-per-day producing Baiji refinery, dramatically expanding its ability
to extract oil and finance its operations (The Chemical Engineer, 2014).
ISIL presents a unique challenge compared to terrorist organizations of the past. Other
Islamist terrorist groups such as Somalia-based Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram in Nigeria have
seized territories, managed infrastructure and attempted governance over populations, but never
on the scale that ISIL has demonstrated, and never emerging victorious against well trained and
equipped armed forces of a state - particularly forces equipped and trained by the U.S. military.
The rout of the Iraqi Army and other subsequent defeats suffered by the Iraqi government forces,
the Kurdish Peshmerga and the Assad regime demonstrate ISIL’s ability as a capable fighting
force. Furthermore, ISIL’s ability to finance itself through the imposition of taxes, extraction of
oil, “protection” money from businesses it threatens, and donations by Islamic charities enable it
to maintain its operational capabilities and fund administrative bodies over territory it seizes.
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ISIL has threatened attacks against the United States, and possesses a number of the
estimated 15,000 foreign fighters that have traveled to Syria in its ranks (The White House,
2014). These European fighters pose particular concern due to their ability to return to their
countries of origin and attack Western targets. These fighters are a serious threat to the national
security of the United States and its allies. The conclusions of this paper provide detailed
analysis of the circumstances surrounding ISIL’s expansion, countermeasures to address these
circumstances, a strategy for countering ISIL both in terms of policy and direct military
confrontation, and a framework for peace in the region. I also examine the histories and
circumstances that allowed ISIL’s beginning and evolution into its present strength, and propose
policy options to counteract these conditions so that ISIL’s appeal is compromised and its ability
to find popular support is degraded. Along with an understanding of the political and ethnic
tensions surrounding the Syria-Iraq region, I provide a nuanced explanation of the regional
dynamics that comprise what is essentially a clashing trifecta of interests and proxy battles.
These insights will help inform varied policy options, and enable policymakers to decide on a
cohesive and long-term strategy for containing ISIL and its eventual elimination.
III. The Challenges
ISIL’s formation would not have been possible without years of instability and chaos
within the states of Iraq and Syria. In the case of Iraq, a Shia-dominated government alienated a
minority Sunni population through political marginalization and purging them from the Iraqi
military, subsequently destabilizing what was already a fragile balance of powers between ethnic
groups while causing disenfranchisement among Iraqi Sunnis. In Syria, the civil war has entered
its third year. Large swathes of the country easily fall within the realm of a “failed state” where
complete absence of central authority from the Al-Assad regime or the Syrian opposition have
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resulted in a myriad of armed groups seizing areas of influence or complete control of said
regions. Islamic State has emerged as the most powerful of the armed groups, even as it battles
not only the Al-Assad regime but also the Syrian opposition and other armed groups operating
within Syria. Its success is attributable not only to its presence in both countries but also its
formidable operational capability and contingency of experienced fighters from its years as Al
Qaeda in Iraq and core of ex-Baathist officers. An influx of experienced foreign fighters from
Tunisia, Chechnya and Libya has also contributed to its fighting ability. Finally, its longevity is
also due to its ability to exploit the populations it controls (through taxes, protection racketeering
and donations) as well as oil and resource extraction.
I explore each of these three dynamics – Malaki-era Iraq, the Syrian civil war and the
presence of Al Qaeda in Iraq - and their historical contribution to the current circumstances,
before extrapolating upon how these dynamics caused the current situation to be an
unprecedented and difficult one.
Sectarian Tensions in Iraq Amid the Rise of Nouri Al-Maliki
The government led by Nouri Al-Maliki came into power in 2006 - the same year that a
vicious cycle of sectarian violence began, leaving thousands massacred through suicide attacks,
car bombings, reprisal killings and abductions that ended in 2007. Maliki, a dissident of the
Baathist regime and leader of an exiled Shia party until the U.S. invasion in 2003, initially
seemed to be a force for sectarian reconciliation and political unity amid the crisis (Parker 2009,
4). Sunnis, particularly those who inhabit the majority-Sunni Anbar and Diyala Provinces, were
instrumental in reversing AQI. Although previously allied with AQI due to a disdain for the
Shia-majority government and grievances against the military and judicial apparatus of the
Maliki government, Sunnis felt even more threatened by AQI’s strict imposition of Sharia law
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and its brutality towards civilians (Parker 2009, 4). There were also subtle political connotations
to Sunni tribes allying themselves to the coalition: Sunnis felt threatened by the Shia-led
government, whose control of Shia militias such as the Al-Sadr Army and others was
questionable at best. At least 20,000 to 50,000 Sunni insurgents were battling the Maliki
government and Coalition forces in 2006 according to the Coalition’s own estimates, whereas
Shias comprised nearly 577,000 members of the Iraqi armed forces (Hughes 2010, 13). By
switching sides and joining the fight against AQI, Sunnis hoped to win protection from the
central government by drawing themselves closer to the U.S. coalition (Parker 2009, 4).
Malaki, as one might have expected, was less than keen to ally himself away from his Shialed bloc in the south. The “shadow state” of Anbar, Diyala, Salah-ad-din and Ninawa provinces
had previously enjoyed heavy patronage by Saddam Hussein, who bolstered the country’s 20
percent Sunni population while using state terror to subdue the Shia majority and Kurdish north
(Hughes 2010, 4). Maliki, whose list of supporters included the Syrian and Iranian governments,
was loath to cooperate with what he considered as former Baathists cooperating solely for U.S.
favor. The Sunnis’ cooperation with foreign jihadist fighters – who in one estimate were
responsible for nine out of ten suicide bombings since spring 2003 – did not endear the Prime
Minister to unification either (Hughes 2010, 10). Over 10,000 Iraqis were killed by suicide
bombers alone, enraging many moderate Sunnis and leading the Awakening movement to
distance itself from jihadist groups, among them AQI (Hughes 2010, 19).
These conditions led to a shaky state held together by a farcical government supposedly
designed along confessional lines, when in reality it was sustained by the presence of American
and Coalition forces. Tensions between the central government and the Awakening Councils
were palpable at one 2007 handover of provincial authority in Diyala (Parker 2009, 2). Several
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commanders of the Awakening Councils went so far as to beg an American commander to
protect them from pending arrest warrants issued from the Iraqi Government (Parker 2009, 2).
Their fears were not unwarranted. Protests against arbitrary detention and imprisonment of
thousands of Sunnis by the national government became commonplace in Anbar province and
persisted until 2013 (Snyder 2014, 2).
Tensions became so prevalent in January 2014 that AQI began to act more aggressively,
and attempted to reclaim territory in Anbar province (Snyder 2014, 2). Political reconciliation
with former Baathists proved difficult, as Maliki’s prohibition on ex-Baathists’ inclusion in the
2010 elections divided Sunnis among those who wanted a unity government and others who
increasingly feared Maliki represented a Shia bloc vengeful after Sunni-led Saddam-era Iraq
(Yamao 2012, 16). Additionally, the Maliki government’s relationships with Kurds in the north
of the country became increasingly strained once the American troops departed. This left Arabs
and Kurds in mixed units and absent a powerful authority or mutual loyalty (Snyder 2014, 2). A
perceived lack of transparency in the national government and the Kurdish desire for a state
exacerbated tensions and alienated Kurds from the Arabs (Snyder 2014, 2). As if this was not
enough, Maliki had solidified himself as a sectarian figure when Minister of Finance Rafi alIssawi, Vice-President Tariq al-Hashemi and Deputy Prime Minister Saleh al-Mutlaq were all
placed under temporary house-arrest by troops and tanks led by his son, Ahmed al-Maliki
(Dodge 2013, 1). Maliki had previously solidified his hold on the Iraqi Special Forces,
Intelligence Services and Iraqi Army by purging officers and members not loyal to his own
political party or affiliated with it, thus making the arrests politically possible (Dodge 2013, 911).
These combined factors led to a situation wherein AQI found itself welcomed as an
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alternative to an increasingly authoritarian Maliki government, and it found support within Sunni
provinces. While preserving its power base in Iraq and avoiding direct confrontation with the
Maliki government, AQI had established itself and attracted fighters in another area of political
instability – Syria.
The Syrian Civil War
The uprising against the regime of Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad began in early 2011
as a reoccurrence of the Arab Spring and a manifestation of Sunni grievances against the
minority Allawite-led government. Political and administrative powers had been collectively
seized by the Assad regime, which filled government positions with members of its Allawite sect
(Al-Azm 2014, 2). Most of the government and senior positions within Syria’s armed forces are
comprised of Allawites or other minorities, such as Christians or Druze, in a country where 60
percent of the population is Sunni (Carpenter 2013, 1-2). Political repression against the Sunni
majority has occurred for decades, and sectarian tensions had risen to the breaking point by the
time the Arab Spring reached Syria. The predictable response of the Al-Assad regime was a
repressive and severe crackdown; peaceful protestors were arrested en masse or shot by snipers.
Torture was widespread and numerous members of the military began to refuse orders to fire on
fellow Syrians (Al-Azm 2014, 4).
As the protests and revolts became more widespread the regime engaged in wholesale
slaughter and destruction of areas it could not control or compel into submission, even resorting
to chemical warfare in the Damascus suburb of Ghouta (Al-Azm 2014, 5). The ferocity of the
conflict and extreme violence undertaken by the regime began to be mirrored by the forces
opposing it, and the conflict dissolved into all-out sectarian warfare pitting the Allawites and
their minority allies against a mix of Free Syrian Army (FSA) moderate opposition forces and
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numerous Al-Qaeda inspired jihadist groups, such as Al-Nusra Front – once considered the
preeminent fighting contingent in Syria, until the advent of ISIL. The Syrian conflict also began
to attract an increasing number of foreign jihadists, including as many as 1,000 experienced
Northern Caucasian fighters who had already fought against the Soviets and considered the
Assad regime to be infidels (Souleimanov 2014, p. 1). This influx also included Chechens,
Dagastanis, and Libyans, and in total comprised the second-largest group of fighters next to nonSyrian Arabs. Their arrival was greeted with a mixture of enthusiasm – for their fighting prowess
– and dismay for their seemingly oblivious violence towards non-combatants (Souleimanov
2014, 1).
The Assad regime continued to fight with complete disregard for civilian casualties,
employing tactics such as razing entire neighborhoods or using so-called “barrel bombs” –
essentially barrels packed with explosives and shrapnel – indiscriminately and with devastating
effect. The Assad regime relied upon its Iranian backers, along with Iranian Special Forces and
Lebanese Hezbollah fighters to bolster its ranks against the jihadist influx and flare-ups in the
conflict (Al-Azm 2014, 6). As the fighting became more decentralized and reliant upon the
strengths of militias for the Assad regime, so did the level of extremism among the ranks of
Islamist fighters fighting against it and – increasingly – the secular Syrian opposition, which was
not as well equipped or financed as many of the foreign jihadi groups. While fanatical groups
such as Al-Nusra – the Al Qaeda affiliate in Syria – fought against the Assad regime, they also
espoused anti-American views and are Sunni extremists (Totten 2013, 3). Fighters from across
the Gulf States are driven by the perception that the Middle East has been a pawn of Western
interests and post-imperialism since the inception of Israel. (Tudor 2010, 5). A merger between
the Al-Nusra Front and ISIL – if it does occur – will ensure yet another civil war between these
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Sunni groups and the moderate Syrian Opposition, even if Al-Assad’s forces are defeated
(Brinkley 2013, 10). Further, these Sunni fighters could also return to their own states in a form
of blowback, or threaten a traditional enemy on the periphery of the conflict: Israel. Al-Nusra has
already shelled the Israeli-held Golan Heights and controls the territory adjacent to them
(Brinkley 2013, 10).
Al-Assad himself did everything he could to make the conflict as sectarian as possible,
both to bolster the claim that he is battling fanatics and to keep his internal allies (Hezbollah,
Iran, Iraqi Shias and Russia) closer to him (Totten 2013, 3-4). Besides the wholesale butchery of
Sunni neighborhoods through shelling and barrel bombing, Al-Assad also released thousands of
jihadist prisoners from his jails as he simultaneously arrested thousands of liberal activists and
political opponents (Salloum 2013, 3). And, while in 2013, analysts such as Totten believed that
groups such as Al-Nusra Front were doomed due to either the Assad regime’s survival or failure,
the sectarian nature of the war in 2014 makes that assertion shaky at best. The protracted conflict
has only exacerbated extremism on both sides and made the Syrian Sunnis more desperate. As
this coincided with the disintegration of relationships between the Iraqi Sunnis and Shias, AQI
realized a power vacuum existed – one that they would fill.
Al Qaeda in Iraq becomes The Islamic State of Iraq and The Levant
AQI began crossing into Syria and fighting alongside the Al-Nusra Front, the officially
branded Al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria in 2012. The battles against the Al-Assad regime became
more fanatical, with the use of suicide bombings and an increasing number of jihadist fighters
emigrating from Turkey, Chechnya and European states to participate in a struggle against what
they regarded as an infidel regime (Salloum 2013, 1-3). With the influx of foreign combatants
came a power struggle among the groups as to who was in charge and carried religious edict. In
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the midst of this chaos, AQI branded itself as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or Islamic
State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). They would later be known simply as Islamic State (IS). The
group was reproached by Al Qaeda’s leader, Aman Al-Zawhari, for brutality and for its attempts
to assert its authority over Al-Nusra Front and absorb its fighters into ISIL’s ranks (Berger 2014,
1).
As a result, ISIL formally split itself away from Al Qaeda in February 2014 (Phillips 2014,
3). It found sympathy among Iraqi Sunnis who felt disenfranchised from the Maliki-led central
government, and recruited numerous Syrian fighters who saw a well-armed and organized group
capable of defeating regime forces (Phillips 3-5). The group’s leader, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi,
projected a vision of jihadist and Sunni Arab revivalism, repeatedly invoking the group’s aim to
dispose of states established by the 1918 Sykes-Picot agreement and proclaiming the formation
of a Caliphate – an Islamic State with one single religious and political leader – in June 2014.
This apparition appealed to many jihadists, who already harbored anti-western resentment
following the U.S. invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan, viewed any non-adherents to Salafist Islam
as infidels worthy only of conversion or death, and desired a return to “traditional” Islam (Alvi
2014, 2).
Current Circumstances and Actions Taken
ISIL has blistered across both Syria and Iraq, racking up a number of resounding military
victories capturing a vast amount of territory spanning both Iraq and Syria (see Figure 1.1). As of
September 12th, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency estimated IS’s strength at 31,000 fighters
in both Syria and Iraq (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2014, “Islamic State Fighter Estimates
Triple – CIA.”), while the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights gauged ISIL’s strength in Syria
at 50,000 fighters, not including its fighters in Iraq (Al Jazeera, 2014). ISIL seized the Iraqi city
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of Mosul – the country’s second-most populous at 1.8 million – in June 2014, as well as the
nearby Baiji refinery, capable of producing 310,000 barrels of oil per day (The Chemical
Engineer, 2014). It captured numerous munitions, artillery pieces, armored fighting vehicles and
aircraft from the retreating Iraqi army.
In the wake of these astonishing advances, ISIL has committed egregious human rights
abuses against religious and ethnic minorities in the areas it controls. The United Nations, in a
report published by both the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq and UNHCR, accused
ISIL of:
attacks directly targeting civilians and civilian infrastructure, executions and other targeted
killings of civilians, abductions, rape and other forms of sexual and physical violence
perpetrated against women and children, forced recruitment of children, destruction or
desecration of places of religious or cultural significance, wanton destruction and looting
of property, and denial of fundamental freedoms (United Nations 2014, 1).
The report also highlighted numerous instances in which religious minorities had been
targeted, their religious or cultural sites desecrated and destroyed, the execution of captured Iraqi
soldiers and evidence that these attacks were of a systemic and premeditated nature (United
Nations 2014, 1-2).
In light of these facts and the unraveling security situation, U.S. President Barack Obama
announced on September 14, 2014 that the United States would conduct airstrikes within Syria
and Iraq against ISIL targets, supported by a coalition of 36 other countries that would assist and
supply groups fighting against ISIL (Eilperin and O’Keefe, 2014). He also called for Congress to
authorize an additional $500 million in aid to train “The Syrian Opposition” rebels, which would
presumably fight both ISIL and the Assad regime simultaneously. Meanwhile, Kurdish
Peshmerga forces, Shia militias and the regular Iraqi Army have been fighting ISIL in a series of
battles ranging from Fallujah to the outskirts of Mosul (see Figure 1.1).
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The field of alliances, while decidedly against ISIL’s odds on paper, reflect the schisms of
the international community and conflicting regional interests that prevent large-scale
coordination against the group. ISIL retains the support of numerous Sunni militias in Iraq and
Syria, ordinary Sunni-Iraqis opposed to the central Iraqi government, and an influx of foreign
fighters seeking jihad and to join what they perceive as the new Caliphate. Against it are arrayed
a number of state and non-state actors. The Coalition includes the Iraqi government and its
armed forces (including independent Shia militias), the Kurdish Peshmerga (in both Iraq and
Syria), France, the United Kingdom, and over three-dozen other countries including some Arab
Gulf states. Meanwhile, the Al-Assad regime, Iran, Turkey, the Al-Nusra Front, the Free Syrian
Army and numerous other armed groups in Syria are also hostile towards ISIL but lack
coordination and hold conflicting interests.
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Figure 1.1 (Areas of ISIL influence or control as of June 14th, 2014)
IV. Literature Review
Combating the type of terrorism perpetrated by ISIL will be far from easy. In frank terms,
ISIL and the conflicts it operates within are unprecedented in terms of difficulty and complexity,
and for a variety of reasons. Unlike previous terrorist groups – save for the Somalian group Al
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Shabaab (The Youth) and the Nigerian Boko Haram (translating to “western education is
forbidden”) jihadists – ISIL seeks to actively control territory, and operated as both a terrorist
group and a militia of sorts. Its ideological impetus stems from an archaic, extremist
interpretation of Islamic Sharia law, and with it the imposition of the historic Islamic empire, the
Caliphate. Thus, while ISIL operates within the confines of the failed Syrian state and the
disarray of Sunni Iraq, and launches what traditionally are considered terrorist attacks (suicide
bombings, asymmetrical warfare and attacks against politicians and military figures), it also
operates as an armed group fighting for and administering territory. It also does so in the midst of
conflicting regional powers vying for control in both Iraq and Syria. However, it can still be
defined as a terrorist organization due to the extreme tactics of intimidation it commits, its
emphasis of attacks upon non-combatants, and its goals of political and territorial change through
the intimidation of parties removed from the conflict (Gaibulloev and Sandler, 3).
Subsequently, it is helpful to analyze how previous terrorist groups were dismantled and
defeated so as to derive conceivable solutions to defeat ISIL. I will analyze three main instances
in which terrorism has been defeated or combatted – the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Ireland,
the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, and the Palestinian organization Hamas – and draw lessons from
these three case studies.
The Irish Republican Army:
The IRA stemmed from a resistance organization known as the Irish Republican
Brotherhood (IRB) that waged violence against the British Empire’s invasion and consolidation
of Northern Ireland (Hoyt 2012, p. 5.) It struggled for over 140 years, collectively against both
the British Empire and Northern Irish Loyalists that opposed the disintegration of Northern
Ireland and the creation of an independent Republic of Ireland (Hoyt 2012, 6-11). The IRA used
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effective guerilla and insurgent-style attacks, divesting itself to the countryside and attacking
isolated outposts as a means of attrition warfare (Hoyt 2012, 11). When confronted with British
military forces, the IRA would instead launch even greater numbers of attacks (albeit some
smaller in scale) to give the impression that the British military intervention was ineffective
(Hoyt 2012, 11). The IRA experienced fits of success and defeat until 1939, when it disastrously
drew both the condemnation of the Irish government and declared a new campaign against the
British – nearly coinciding with the outbreak of World War II (Hoyt 2012, 8). Bombings maimed
and killed civilians, resulting in condemnations from all parties and not merely the British
government (Hoyt 2012, 8). This was not in itself surprising, as the group had been declared
illegal by the independent government of Ireland in the 1930s and the British public faced far
more lethal bombing from the Nazis in the years following 1939 (Hoyt 2012, 8-9).
Little changed and no concessions were made, even as a military stalemate was evident to
both sides by the 1970s; however, the lack of a political settlement or redressing of Republican
grievances meant that no solution produced itself until much later than necessary (Jorge et al
2011, p 15). The protracted conflict lasted until the early 1990s, when it finally became clear to
all parties that the IRA could not defeat the British forces and that British forces would never
fully eliminate the IRA (Hoyt 2012, 15). This coincided with an inclusion of Irish Republican
interests in the 1998 Good Friday Agreement – Republicans stated that this was the first occasion
where their political concerns were addressed and acted upon (Jorge et al 2011, 13).
The IRA officially declared that it was ending its offensive operations in 1994, leading to
consolidation between Irish Republicans and Loyalists, but lingering fanatics still remained
(Clubb 2014, 5). To counter the possibility that a fanatic would launch an attack, the IRA had to
undergo a process of disengagement, which manifested in three critical steps – (1) disarmament,
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(2) de-mobilization, and (3) reintegration, or DDR (Clubb 2014, 5). DDR campaigns reduced the
risk of a continuation of conflict, provided avenues of reintegration into military or political
structures, and allowed former fighters to report plots from other ex-members, thus preventing a
reoccurrence of violence. The IRA formally declared its demobilization and renounced violence
in 2005 (Clubb 2014, 6); however, Loyalist fighters who were loath to give up their weapons,
disaffected members of the former IRA, and prominent members who went on to create splinter
groups (Clubb 2014, 6-7).
The IRA’s legacy and how the conflict between Republican, Loyalist and the British ended
are hardly glamorous examples of how terrorism can be resolved. Decades of insurgent-style
warfare, bombings, military reprisals and thousands of civilian deaths eventually gave way to
political concessions and mutual recognition. While political consolidation is hardly a method
applicable to ideological fanatics such as IS fighters, undermining their support by recognizing
Sunni grievances and interests in both Syria, and more pertinently Iraq, are examples of where
this approach could be applied. If Sunnis were not disenfranchised by the Iraqi government they
would almost certainly exchange its authority for ISIL’s brutal rule and massacres against their
religious-minority neighbors. However, this phenomena – the switching of sides by Sunnis
opposed to ISIL rule – would almost certainly not occur in a uniform fashion, hence the need for
DDR campaigns and the long-term imposition of a peace-building process. Sunnis will need
mediums for reporting radicalism to a central authority, a trust-building reconciliation that results
in either disarmament or inclusion of Sunnis into the Iraqi armed forces. Reintegration into the
Iraqi government – or stronger political processes that guarantee transparency – will be
imperative in ensuring a successful transformation.
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Sri Lanka and the Tamil Tigers:
The struggle waged by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) underlined an ethnic
conflict with similarities to the current situation in Iraq. The indigenous Tamils, who comprised
approximately 12.5 percent of the population, are of different ethnic identity, language, and
religion than the majority (74.5 percent) Sinhala (Samaranayake 2007, 2). The Sinhala-speaking
Sinhalese, who are of Indian descent and Buddhist, consider themselves the authentic inhabitants
of the country, whereas the Tamils believe in Hinduism, speak mostly Tamil and are
geographically separated from the south-western and central-dwelling Sinhalas, instead being
concentrated mostly in the north and east of the country (Samaranayake 2007, 2-3). The schism
between the two groups resulted in a Tamil separatist movement. Violence broke out beginning
after the withdrawal of British forces and subsequent independence of Sri Lanka in 1948
(Samaranayake 2007, 2). Ethnic riots occurred in 1956, 1958, 1978 and 1983.
These only served as the impetus for the separatist movement to take action, as the 1983
riots were especially ferocious (Samaranayake 2007, 4). High levels of Tamil unemployment,
disenchantment with the Sinhala government and a weak security state all contributed to the rise
of the LTTE, which grew into prominence out of an initial 35 groups and a great deal of
infighting (Samaranayake 2007, 4-5). The LTTE employed guerilla warfare, political
assassinations, insurgent attacks, massacres against civilians and most notably suicide bombings
as its operational tactics. This tactic in particular drew notoriety; LTTE was the first group to
“perfect” the use of suicide vests and bombings according to the FBI (DeVotta 2009, 2). In
some manners these preconditions and tactics deployed draw similarities with the situations in
Syria and Iraq presented by ISIL; however, the LTTE had little ideological impulse aside from a
smattering of Tamil nationalism. Its grievances stemmed largely from a sense of political
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impotence and ethnic grievances against the Sinhalese. The scale of the conflict also draws less
comparison to Iraq or Syria; although horrific, a total of 6,749 civilians were casualties of LTTE
attacks from 1984 to 2004 (Samaranayake 2007, 8).
The resolution of the LTTE insurgency came about through a variety of external and
internal factors. As with the Irish Republican Army, the paths to inclusion and peace were
unglamorous, hampered repeatedly and hewn out over a long and arduous process. First, a
number of external peacekeeping forces were deployed to bear in an attempt to end the conflict
or draw buffer zones between the combatants. This began with the Indian Peacekeeping Force in
1987. The force’s inception derived from an agreement between the Sri Lankan government and
India– LTTE was not a party to the agreement – but ultimately resulted in failure, with the
force’s withdrawal in 1990 after suffering 1,200 losses (Roberts 2014, 5). A 2002 Norewigan
peacekeeping delegation spearheaded the creation of a ceasefire agreement (CAF) and the
deployment of a peacekeeping force, The Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM). Both the Sri
Lankan Prime Minister and the LTTE leader signed the CFA, but sporadic violence still
continued despite the presence of the SLMM (Roberts 2014, 5-6). Despite its initial aspirations,
the CFA was repeatedly broken by the LTTE and resulted in the termination of the SLMM in
2008. The Sri Lankan government withdrew from the CFA a scant two weeks later (Roberts
2014, 5).
The third and final external intervention came about amid more attempts at political
solutions. The presence of UN and NGO personnel in designated “safe areas” within the country
compelled an end of hostilities in these limited areas, although they were frequently violated by
both the Sri Lankan government forces and the LTTE (Roberts 2014, 6). The result was an
international outcry underlining every instance in which the safe areas became death zones due
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to shelling or suicide bombings, and the UN was able to pursue peace initiatives under the
auspices of Right to Protect (or R2P) doctrine. Subsequently, the UN took humanitarian crises
and civilian deaths as much more serious violations than it had before the adoption of the R2P
doctrine in 2005 (Roberts 2014, 6-7). However, an international presence of UN and NGO
personnel was not enough to stop the conflict.
The unraveling of the LTTE occurred for a number of reasons. First, it attracted
international condemnation through its use of suicide attacks and high-profile political
assassinations (DeVotta 2009, 21). The group was responsible for the assassination of the Indian
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991, and engaged in money-laundering, financial fraud and
human trafficking within numerous states, leading thirty countries to label it a terrorist
organization by the end of 2001 (DeVotta 2009, 21). Second, the group supported a nationalist
presidential candidate, Mahinda Rajapaksa, who in turn had no qualms over resolving the
conflict through pure military force rather political concessions or a distributive system of power.
Third, and perhaps most fatally, it underwent internal fissures that doomed its capability as both
a political and military threat (DeVotta 2009, 21-22). The Sri Lankan military, at the behest of
Rajapaska, finally seized control of the entire country in May 2009, leading to the LTTE’s
surrender.
What can be learned from the LTTE example? External intervention is sometimes
ineffective despite the best intentions, and that the creation of “safe zones” is not a guarantee that
the areas will be a sanctuary for civilians or act as effective buffers between warring parties.
Another observation to be made is that the creation of safe zones made the conflict international,
with nations paying attention and popular outcry following every violation of these safe havens.
One route to defeating ISIL lies in securing the Syrian state as prerequisite to uniting both the
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Al-Assad regime and the Free Syrian Army against their common existential enemy. A method
of accomplishing a small manner of cooperation would be the establishment of humanitarian
corridors to be controlled or policed by a neutral third party or UN detachment, such as the case
with the UN mission to the Balkans. However, as was the case in the Balkan conflict and above
demonstrated in the LTTE insurgency, such safe zones can be easily compromised and
exacerbate rather than mitigate the conflict.
Military defeat and international ire were the main components to defeating the LTTE and
ensuring its final demise. However, these options are not immediately available for use against
ISIL, nor would they necessarily be effective if employed against it. The LTTE never posed
much more than an internal threat to the Sinhala population. While it carried out the
assassination of a prominent foreign political leader, it did not have territorial ambitions beyond
Sri Lanka itself. Nor did it attract numerous foreign fighters to its cause, massacre thousands of
prisoners and civilians or threaten the regional balance of powers, as ISIL has done and seems
poised to do if it remains unchecked. Moreover, the LTTE did not carry a significant ideological
or religious impetus as part of its appeal; its struggle was purely political and ethnic. The failures
of external peacemakers to solve the LTTE crisis should be observed as possible lessons or
cautionary notes for external action in areas controlled by ISIL.
Israel and Hamas:
Hamas’s origins stem from the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement (Harakat the
Mouqawama of Islamiyya), as an offshoot of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (Cepoi 2013, 4).
Hamas emerged from this organization as an armed militant group combating the Israeli
occupation of the Gaza Strip during the Intifida (Cepoi 2013, 4). However, this was not the
original composition of Hamas. Its initial charter declared itself as the Palestinian branch of the

Bowie 22

Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, and derived its authority from Islamic principles of law. It
proclaimed that Jihad was a struggle every Muslim should seek, even to death, particularly in
instances where Muslim lands were occupied (Cepoi 2013, 5). Hamas benefited from numerous
charities, social organizations and schools the Muslim Brotherhood had established in Israel
prior to its inception (Cepoi 2013, 5).
While founded on militaristic Islamist concepts, Hamas became an authoritative movement
when a right-wing Israeli political coalition rose and continued oppressing the Intifada in 1989.
The group called for the destruction of Israel, liberation of Palestinian lands, and combined
principles of Islamism with a populist movement emerging from the suffering Palestinians
endured.
Israel confronted Hamas in a particularly heavy-handed manner, sealing off access to the
West Bank in 2004 in the aftermath of the 2000 Second Intifidah. In the preceding three years,
867 Israeli deaths were attributed to terrorism perpetrated by Hamas and other Islamist militancy
groups (Byman 2012, 1). These attacks involved shootings, suicide bombings, and cross-border
fire from the Gaza Strip. Following the death of Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, Hamas won 74
out of 132 seats in the 2005 Legislative Council elections for the Palestinian Authority,
compared to Fatah’s 45 (Rolston 2014, 5-6). The Islamic tenants of Hamas stood in contrast with
Mahmoud Abbas’s nationalist Fatah movement, which was confined to the occupied West Bank
following the 2005 elections. Thus, Hamas formally seized control of the Gaza Strip in 2006
(Marshall 2014, 2). The Gaza War of 2008-2009 caused significant damage to the Gaza Strip,
with much of it demolished (Marshall 2014, 3). However, Israel was unable to wrest Hamas from
the Gaza Strip, and it remained in control of the entire territory. Israel’s unilateral ceasefire was
followed by a strict embargo on most goods crossing into the Gaza Strip. A double fence,
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concrete barrier, numerous guard towers and a naval blockade cordon the entire Gaza Strip,
allowing Israel to control all economic and personal movement in and out of the area (Al-Haq
2014, 4).
Cross border rocket-fire by Hamas in retaliation for the murder of a Palestinian teenager by
Jewish radicals resulted in Israel launching Operation Protective Edge in July 2004 (Sprusansky
2014, 4). This war involved heavy bombing and shelling by Israel, including a limited ground
invasion, resulting in 73 Israeli and in excess of 2,100 Palestinian deaths (British Broadcasting
Corporation 2014, “Gaza Crisis.”). Despite the conflict, Hamas still remains more popular than
Fatah because of the popular perception that it “stands up” to Israel, rather than engaging in
political negotiations (Marshall 2014, 3).
What can be learned from the Israeli and Hamas conflict? First, that unlike ISSL, Hamas
has civilian and political interests at stake that Israel can leverage and negotiate with (Vick 2014,
1). Secondly, that direct armed conflict without redressing of political or social grievances only
protracts conflict rather than ending it. Israel possesses the best equipped and supplied military in
the Middle East, has blockaded Hamas’s area of control for years, invaded the Gaza Strip twice
in the last decade, and still has not defeated the group. Budget considerations of the Israeli
Defense Force aside, pure military action against Hamas has only backfired on Israel, resulting in
Hamas’s increased popularity among Palestinians in both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.
Therefore, we can conclude that even protracted and heavy military action alone will not
eradicate a terrorist group that enjoys popular support among the population it originates from.
Political negotiations and ideological warfare must also be considered in any long-term effort to
address the causes of terrorism. While direct political negotiations with ISIL extremists are
unlikely to be successful, attempts at redressing Sunni tribal grievances in Iraq may succeed if
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the new Iraqi government can either grant more local autonomy or govern in a more inclusive
fashion.
V. Proposed Responses
Option 1: Minimalist Approach – no boots on the ground; support existing allies financially
and logistically; conduct “targeted strikes” against ISIL leadership
The Policy: Direct American involvement in the Middle East has only resulted in protracting
conflicts without addressing the causes behind them, while incurring American casualties and
extremely expensive operations. The chaos of the Syrian civil war or the schisms within Iraqi
politics are issues that cannot be resolved by external forces. This policy recommends an absence
of large-scale airstrikes and advocates instead for as small a footprint as possible for the U.S.
coalition. Coalition countries would support Peshmerga, Iraqi Army and FSA forces against ISIL
through financial contributions and the provision of weapons and supplies. Bankrolling these
armed forces will allow them to purchase the equipment they need and pay their fighters.
Additionally, it gives them the latitude needed to bribe or buy local tribes’ loyalty if needed, as is
common practice in Sunni tribal areas and has been done by ISIL. The United States and its
coalition would also support commanders and armed forces through intelligence-gathering and
sharing, political backing, and granting international legitimacy to their efforts and gains. The
use of drones to gather intelligence is already being conducted by the United States within Syria,
and drones are also able to provide real-time battlefield intelligence for ground forces (Entous,
Barnes, Nissenbaum, 2014, 1). Armed action would only be undertaken through precision
airstrikes or drone attacks against ISIL leadership targets or clearly identified convoys. The goal
of this strategy is to minimize civilian casualties caused by Coalition involvement and avoid
repeating shock-and-awe tactics that may have been militarily effective but vaporized popular
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support for Western forces.
This policy offers two main strengths. First, it abstains from Coalition airstrikes that could
potentially kill civilians and turn local ire against the West and bolster support for anti-Western
groups, such as ISIL. Second, it keeps a large-scale deployment of U.S. and Coalition forces out
of the region. This avoids the possibility of Coalition casualties and instead places the onus of
ground fighting on the indigenous forces that will control the territory they seize. Shared
intelligence centers would be instituted between the Coalition and the Baghdad government in
Baghdad, while similar centers would be established in the Kurdish city of Erbil. Meanwhile, the
Coalition can still contribute to the cause through supporting the different groups with arms,
supplies and financial backing, while avoiding the entanglements that airstrikes or deployment of
ground forces would entail. This strategy allows the Coalition to focus on eliminating the
leadership of ISIL while the regional ground forces take ownership of the fight – a fight for
territory that they will eventually control.
Option 2: Proxy Warfare and Coalition Airstrikes - advise and support Kurdish, FSA and
Iraqi ground forces
The Policy: This policy recommends attacking ISIL through Coalition-led airstrikes while
simultaneously lending logistical, training and field-advising support to regional ground forces.
Coalition airstrikes will degrade ISIL capability by attacking field positions, convoys, logistical
centers, communication lines and individual ISIL leaders, while regional ground forces advance
and roll back ISIL militants and reclaim lost territory. Coalition forces will also provide training
and weaponry to our allies in the region that oppose ISIL and the Al-Assad regime. In Iraq this
involves directly supporting the Iraqi-Kurdish Peshmerga and the regular Iraqi Army (currently
Shia-dominated), while in Syria it entails aiding Syrian Kurds and the overwhelmingly Sunni –
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but moderate - FSA.
This approach strengthens the moderate FSA, bolsters the Iraqi Army and Kurdish
Peshmerga and provides a roadmap for the retaking and rehabilitation of ISIL-controlled areas in
Iraq and Syria. While it involves increased Coalition involvement, it minimizes risks to Coalition
personnel and still gives the responsibility of ground fighting to the forces that will eventually
control the territory. Coalition airstrikes will attack targets outside of regional ground forces’
reach and provide local air superiority when the ground forces are engaged. The CIA has
indicated that a sustained bombing campaign would require ground-level spies in order to
facilitate accurate strikes; therefore a substantial covert presence will be essential in order to
ensure successful attacks (Stein 2014, 2). These combined factors will prove decisive in battles
where logistical support and the ability to bring up reinforcements for protracted conflicts are
essential.
It also allows regional Coalition members to play a wider role in the effort, as they can
provide host cites for training moderate Syrian rebels and bases for airstrikes against ISIL. They
would also be able to financially and logistically support elements fighting ISIL and other
extremist groups while keeping their own armed forces safe, avoiding a “boots on the ground”
strategy. This is largely the policy being conducted now by the Obama administration. However,
airstrikes alone along with training support may not prove sufficient to destroy ISIL (Stansfield
2014, 11).
Option 3: Direct Action and Détente in Iraq and Syria – airstrikes against Assad to force a
détente and political resolution to the Syrian Civil War, establishment of UN Safe Zones
within Kurdish territories, and an all-of-the-above military strategy against ISIL
The Policy: Destroying ISIL cannot be accomplished so long as the Syrian civil war continues
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and areas of the country lay outside of control of either the Assad government or the Free Syrian
Army. The humanitarian crisis is a concern as well. Refugee camps are often ideal breeding
grounds for extremism, such as they were for the Taliban when Afghan refugees fled to camps in
Pakistan during the Soviet-Afghan conflict. According to the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 3.2 million refugees had fled from Syria by November
2014 (Amos 2014, 2). The possibility that these refugees could be radicalized by the brutality
they have witnessed should not be ignored. Therefore political, humanitarian and Machiavellian
concerns call for an intervention to end the Syrian civil war before more radicalization occurs.
We should well consider the Balkans conflict of the 1990s, wherein NATO airstrikes
played a crucial role in causing Slobodan Milosevic to assert more authority over Serbian groups
and generals and helped bring an end to the conflict at the Dayton Accords. In the case of Syria,
the “Right to Protect” protocol should be invoked and Coalition airstrikes should bomb Syrian
targets that are instrumental to their war effort. The targets of this bombing would include
munitions dumps, airfields, artillery units shelling innocent civilians in cordoned-off cities, and
critical military infrastructure such as command and control centers. These airstrikes should be
undertaken with a mind towards saving lives and weakening – not destroying - the Syrian armed
forces, as the ultimate aim of the strikes is to force Al-Assad to the negotiating table with the
Syrian Opposition and mete out a peace deal. Weakening Al-Assad too much could upset the
regional balance of power and cause regime areas to be overrun by ISIL and other jihadist
groups.
The former United Kingdom Chief of Defense, General Sir David Richards was quoted as
saying “air power alone will not win a campaign like this…You have to put your own boots on
the ground at some point or else you have to very energetically and aggressively train up those
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who will do that for us and with us” (Stansfield 2014, 13). Accordingly, an all-encompassing
approach is required to put a permanent end to this conflict. Intelligence gathering and airstrikes
will be helpful but not decisive methods of achieving victory.
This policy proposes the creation of United Nations Safe Zones (UNSZs) within Kurdishcontrolled areas of Syria and Iraq, along with both Kurdish and FSA border corridors of both
Iraq and Turkey once these areas are firmly controlled by the forces concerned. Specific cities
and sites would include Kirkuk and Erbil in Iraq, and Hassakeh and northwest of Aleppo in Syria
(see Figure 1.1). These UNSZs would be created and maintained in the style of the safe zones
that were implemented in the Balkans Conflict and the LTTE Conflict, with Coalition air support
and UN or Coalition troops securing the areas in conjunction with Peshmerga ground forces.
Steps such as DDR campaigns would help reintegrate Sunnis into a new Iraqi civil society and
provide a bulwark against new insurgencies in Sunni tribal areas. Meanwhile, Peshmerga forces
would be expected to conduct the bulk of frontline fighting against ISIL, while Coalition forces
would provide territorial security, artillery and airstrike support as needed – all while mediating
between the Sunni tribes and the new Iraqi government.
In Syria, these combined actions would bring a temporary halt to the refugee crisis.
Furthermore, this process would hasten the process of negotiations between the Assad regime
and the Syrian opposition, as both elements would be subjected to further international scrutiny
amid the presence of UN personnel. Jihadist elements would be attacked and rooted out from
within the UNSZs by Coalition airstrikes and Peshmerga forces working in conjunction with
U.S. ground advisors.
This development is designed to cause ISIL to react in one of two ways – either intensify
their attacks against the newly-created UNSZs and Peshmerga-controlled areas, or retreat from
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these areas and focus its fighting against the Assad and Free Syrian Army forces. If the first case
were to occur, superior Coalition and UN forces would be able to destroy ISIL troops, which
would then be forced into an insurgency or hit-and-fade style of warfare. If the latter were to
occur, both the Syrian Opposition and the Assad regime would face increased pressure as they
would be bearing the brunt of ISIL and jihadist attacks, and both sides would be further
compelled to end the war and accept a political solution. Whether this resulted in power-sharing
or the splitting-up of Syria into different states (balkanization) would have to be determined
during direct negotiations between the Assad government and the Syrian Opposition.
In either case, securing borders and defining state boundaries would be of foremost
importance to both sides. A successful political outcome would allow both the opposition forces
and the Assad regime to fight against their common enemy: ISIL, Al-Nusra Front, and other
jihadist groups fighting in the country. ISIL would find itself caught between the UNSZs and the
united forces of the Syrian Opposition and the Assad government, and likely be annihilated.
Such an agreement would also curtail ISIL’s ability to control border crossings with Turkey and
Iraq that are not under Kurdish control, and deprive ISIL of the benefits it enjoys by controlling
these crossings.
Forcing a political solution would require Western powers to actively force equilibrium
between Assad’s forces and the Free Syrian Army, thus compelling Assad to undertake
negotiations. While it is unlikely that Assad will give up the Presidency of his own state, it is
possible that he will grant control of local or regional areas to opposition forces. If the outcome
of political negotiations is balkanization – the creation of separate states for pro-Assad areas and
opposition territories – Assad would likely remain as head of state for the area of regime control.
In either case, the Syrian opposition and the Assad regime would still have to contend with areas
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of Syria held by the Al-Nusra Front and ISIL. Fanatical Salifist and Islamist groups are a
common enemy of both the Allawites and the “moderate” Sunni-majority opposition; thus both
they and the Kurdish forces would be free to concentrate their combined capabilities against
jihadist-controlled territories in Syria. This option offers a more permanent solution to the
problem – the ability of jihadist groups, such as ISIL, to fester in conflict areas and the ending of
the increasingly fanatical and destructive Syrian civil war. It also addresses the issue of failedstate areas that have been controlled by ISIL and other jihadist groups, such as Al Nusra. It also
preserves the fragile balance of powers between Sunni and Shiite in the broader Middle East;
Iran will not lose its client state (Assad-controlled Syria) while Hezbollah will retain the
protection of its-cross border ally. All neighboring states will benefit from the resolution of the
conflict and the refugee crisis may be abated.
VI. Getting Started – Option 3
“Option 1”’s weakness is a result of its crafting – a minimalist approach is likely to have a
minimal effect upon events and the course of the conflict. Regional forces are liable to pursue
their own intentions rather than the interests of the Coalition or resolution of the conflicts.
Minimal interference by the Coalition risks ISIL continuing its advances and solidifying its
control over the territory it holds, committing more massacres and building strength. It is true
U.S. airstrikes proved extremely effective when conducted in coordination with Northern
Alliance troops in Afghanistan, with the assistance of CIA operatives on the ground (O’Hanlon
2014, 2). However, this limited engagement will not solve the problem of unit cohesion in the
Iraqi Army, or allow political redress of Iraqi Sunni grievances, nor will it force an end to the
Syrian civil war.
“Option 2” calls for a stronger and more sustained response but also has its own risks. Any
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instance of aerial bombing or missile strikes carries the danger that civilians will be inadvertently
killed or caught in the midst of ISIL positions or convoys. ISIL has adapted to Coalition
airstrikes by spreading itself within heavily populated civilian areas and avoiding travel via large
convoys; therefore the risk that civilians will be harmed by airstrikes is increased. Misguided
airstrikes that kill civilians will inevitably outrage the population, an outcome that would
strengthen ISIL and play into its hands (Stein 2014, 3). Providing weaponry and ammunition to
Syrian opposition and Iraqi ground forces may result in their capture by opposing forces. The
full-scale retreat of the Iraqi army during ISIL’s first offensives resulted in huge amounts of
equipment being captured and reused by ISIL. This scenario cannot be repeated. Simultaneously,
it is difficult to determine what elements of the Syrian opposition are “moderate” and will not
engage in extremism or war crimes if they retake territory held by the Assad regime. Such war
crimes would involve culpability of the Coalition forces that supplied these groups.
According to Daniel Benjamin of the Brookings Institution, a Washington-based thinktank, striking ISIL with only airstrikes will not solve the problem of terrorism (Benjamin 2014,
2); a more overarching strategy is required to address the crisis ISIL poses. Michael O’Hanlon of
the Council on Foreign Relations calls for a force of 1,000 to 5,000 U.S. troops to be embedded
within “indigenous” forces inside Iraq (O’Hanlon 2014, 3). These would serve as “advisors” to
conduct training in the field, call in tactical airstrikes against ISIL positions, improve cohesion of
Iraqi units, and establish a Coalition presence on the ground (O’Hanlon 2014, 3).
“Option 3” requires heavy involvement from the Coalition or a UN force and is unlikely to
have public or international backing. Both the Syrian and Iraqi Kurds would have to agree to the
implementation of UNSZs and the negotiations would likely be tedious and result in many false
starts before a resolution of differences could be achieved. Ethnic cleansing – already a brutal
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aspect of the Syrian civil war – could become more pronounced if balkanization were to occur.
Furthermore, the question of a Kurdish state would undoubtedly arise, and pose difficult
questions for the relevant countries that would be affected – Iraq, Syria and Turkey. Turkey has
historically been opposed to any idea of a Kurdish state (especially one in which Turkey cedes
territory), while the question of Kurdish autonomy in Syria is largely unknown. Iraqi Kurdistan
already enjoys regional autonomy from the central government in Baghdad. At larger question
would be the position of the combined Peshmerga forces should they force a defeat of ISIL and
accept the idea of UNSZs within their territory. The creation of a Kurdish state would almost
certainly be advocated for by many in the Kurdish community (Stein 2014, 4), causing instability
in Turkey, Iraq and post-war Syria.
ISIL’s ascension was made possible by the existence of two failed states fighting pitched
battles along Islamic sectarian divides. These conflicts have heightened extremism in the area
and proven conducive for ISIL’s appeal among many of its fighters and to prospective recruits
(Stansfield 2014, 4). Accordingly, while eliminating ISIL as a terrorist group is the underlying
objective, resolving these conflicts is the only path of ensuring the impetus to terrorism is
defused permanently. In other words, it requires the Syrian civil war’s resolution and the creation
of either a politically stable Iraq or a federation of states in Iraq – states that ensure that Kurdish,
Sunni and Shiite interests are represented equally. Sunni Iraq was peaceful following the
Awakening, when Sunni militias allied themselves to the American forces and were hostile
towards AQI.
Destroying ISIL requires a recognition of it as both a terrorist and militia group, and
choosing a strategy that best addresses the underlying and long-term causes of its development.
“Option 3” is the most thorough approach and answers the humanitarian catastrophe, political
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tensions, failed-state situations and regional challenges. It is a far-reaching and ambitious
strategy, but it has the best chance of destroying ISIL and its capacity to reconstitute itself.
Denying ISIL safe haven in both Iraq and Syria is not an impossible goal in “Option 3”.
“Option 3” best addresses what is in essence a two-part problem: the conflicts in both Syria
and Iraq and the regional powers perpetuating them. This involves both combating terrorism and
pursuing effective foreign policies that resolve the states’ interests at hand. I will now address
these in sequence: Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, the Assad Regime, the Syrian Opposition and the
regional Kurds.
Turkey has indicated it will not pursue action against ISIL without actions being taken
against the Assad regime by the Coalition (Christie-Miller, 1). This was especially evident
during the battle for Kobane and Turkey’s unwillingness to aid the Syrian Kurds. Once allies of
Syria, Turkey has been overwhelmed by the influx of over 400,000 Syrian refugees into its
borders (UNHCR 2013, 2) and incurred $800 million in costs as of May 2013. Estimates by the
UNHCR show that the number of Syrian refugees in Turkey alone would reach a million by the
end of 2014 (UNHCR 2013, 2). Subsequently, Turkey has both a practical and a political interest
in resolving the Syrian civil war. Turkey will likely endorse the idea of UNSZs outside its
borders in order to relieve the strain on its own refugee camps and services. However, Turkey
will strongly object to any autonomy of Kurdish territories within Syria due to the conflicts it has
held with the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK). Turkey fought an insurgency led by the PKK from
1983 to 2013, resulting in 40,000 deaths (Celebi et al 2014, 1), and would be unwilling to aid in
the creation of a Kurdish state.
Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the majority of Gulf States may regard the Coalition with
suspicion, and voice their own concerns over regional stability. While it is true that ISIL poses a
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serious threat to the ruling regimes of these countries, many of them view Iran as a greater threat
than ISIL. They would want reassurances that a stronger Iraq would not prove a stronger ally to
Shia Iran. They are also concerned with the possibility of radicalized fighters from their
countries returning and conducting terrorist attacks against their own citizens.
Lebanon’s response would be more intriguing and dangerous, as the country has already
absorbed a refugee influx that accounts for nearly 20 percent of its overall population. In
addition, Lebanon already balances a difficult sectarian divide between Sunnis who want to fight
against Al-Assad and the terrorist organization Hezbollah, whose fighters proved instrumental in
bolstering Al-Assad in a number of battles. Backdoor diplomacy and additional aid would be
required to keep the status quo and prevent a breakout of sectarian conflicts. The Lebanese
government in particular would need to be convinced that they would benefit by allowing tacit
approval of the Coalition action – putting a temporary halt to the refugee crisis and attempting to
bring about an end to the Syrian civil war would legitimately be in its best interest.
Iran would likely welcome any action taken against ISIL by the United States and its
Coalition, but would be extremely concerned by the idea of the Assad regime collapsing. The
goal of bringing about peace to Syria while maintaining Allawite and Shia power bases in the
country would be their primary goal. The destruction of ISIL would be a step towards this goal;
however, Al-Assad would likely have to step down as leader of either a re-integrated Syria or
enjoy a much weakened Syrian Allawite state if the country was divided in a peace deal. Iran
would find either scenario galling, as Al-Assad has been their long-time client and ally.
However, working with Coalition forces may well help Iran gain regional influence and re-enter
the international community as it continues to negotiate over its nuclear program.
VII. Conclusion
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ISIL’s success is attributable to a combination of multiple factors: its appeal to
marginalized Iraqi Sunnis, its fighting prowess against other forces battling in the Syrian civil
war, its ideological appeal to fundamentalist Salafist Muslims and its past military victories. It
operates with impunity due to the failed-state status of northern Syria and western Iraq.
Dislodging ISIL from its territories will require sustained, prolonged action conducted by
regional actors supported by Coalition forces with intelligence, logistical support, training and
political mediation. It will also require long-term thinking on the part of both regional and
international powers as to how terrorism can be recognized pre-emptively, and question when
protracted civil conflicts should be forced to an end by external forces to prevent terrorism or
extremism from developing within failed states. The international community has remained
gridlocked on the question of the Syrian civil war for over three years, despite the brutality of the
conflict and the incredible difficulties placed on neighboring states by the mass exodus of Syrian
refugees.
Addressing and forcing an end to the Syrian civil war is therefore integral not only to
defeating ISIL but to ensuring regional stability. While the United Nations Security Council
(UNSC) has been rendered incapable of action by Russian vetoes, a UNSC-approved action
would not necessarily be required in order to bring about sufficient change in Syria. Russia has
largely played its hand and ignored international sentiment through its seizure of the Crimea and
its involvement in the Ukrainian Conflict; as such, it has little legitimacy to denounce foreign
intervention in Syria.
Terrorism is an issue that has persisted for decades, and in the case of the IRA, the conflict
between it and the United Kingdom lasted nearly 140 years. Terrorism is nothing new to the
Middle East, yet the threat that ISIL carries is both real and a radical departure from past terrorist
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groups. Addressing new challenges requires trying original solutions, while incorporating the
lessons of the past. In the literature review of this essay, I discussed how DDR campaigns proved
effective following the disbandment of the IRA, massive military action against Hamas proved
costly and ultimately ineffective, and the protracted struggle against the LTTE combined with
international mediation, the creation of safe-zones, and a multilateral presence finally culminated
in a bloody end to the Tamil Tigers. Elements of success can be found in all three of these
instances. Massive military engagement is needed in order to bring about an end to the Syrian
civil war, reestablish local and regional balances and combat ISIL directly, while international
mediation is needed to ensure a ceasefire or peace process between the Assad regime and the
Syrian Opposition. Implementation of DDR campaigns in both Iraq and Syria stand a chance of
helping reintegrate disillusioned Sunnis into a new nationalist Iraqi identity and aid security
forces in their fight against extremism.
Perhaps the most daunting aspect of the conflict ISIL is its location: as we have discussed
before, ending the Syrian civil war is an almost certain prerequisite to eradicating ISIL. This may
prove more challenging on a multilateral and international level rather than directly confronting
ISIL in a “boots on the ground” scenario. However, the international community has overlooked
the Syrian civil war and its horrors for the past three years, and ISIL is one of the consequences
of following this naïve approach. Eliminating failed-state situations and fanatical, inter-Islamic
sectarian warfare is imperative to depriving ISIL of its extremist message and basis for support
by desperate Sunnis. Once the international community recognizes and addresses this reality, it
will be in a much better position to deprive ISIL of its safe haven in Syria.
Resolving Iraq’s internal differences and political tensions will require equal effort. Sunni
support must be won back, in a process that will require time and genuine goodwill by the new
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Iraqi government. Granting local autonomy or instituting a quota or confessional system of
government akin to Lebanon’s system may help smooth over sectarian differences, and convince
Sunnis that membership in a united Iraq better serves their interests rather than aligning with the
likes of ISIL. Resolving the inadequacies of Sykes-Picot and the practices of patronage the West
has pursued, in the eyes of many, may well be the key to crippling anti-Western sentiment in the
area, and depriving ISIL of another argument in its ideological appeal. The creation of new
nation-states has never been easy – but the existence of arbitrary states with fundamental,
irreversible differences has proven to be difficult also. In combating and destroying ISIL, new
countries may emerge that will enforce security and stability in the region in ways current states
cannot. The path that the United States and its Coalition take will decide the fate of the region –
and whether it suffers from the blight of terrorism – for decades to come, just as western powers
once divided the region up for their own interests nearly a century ago. This time, however, the
West should act with both its and the inhabitants’ interests at heart – the destruction of ISIL and
the creation of states and governments that best represent the nations and tribes present.
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